OBSCENITY-DISSECTION

OF THEATRICAL PLAYS

INTO SPEECH AND

TO THE Roth RULE?Southeastern Promotions, Inc. v. Conrad, 341 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.
Tenn. 1972).
CONDUCT

COMPONENTS:

AN

EXCEPTION

A person gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into it, and what
is one man's comfort and inspiration is another's jest and scorn.'
The plaintiff, a New York corporation engaged in the business of
presenting commercial theatrical productions, had contractual relations
giving it presentation rights for the theatrical group that owned and
produced the rock musical "Hair". 2 The plot of the play centers upon
the character Claude, a loosely formed community of his friends, and
their reaction to his upcoming military induction. Intertwined are social commentaries on such subjects as "love, peace, freedom, war, racism, air pollution, parents .... hair, the flag, drugs, and sex." At the
end of the first act all performers, both male and female, appear nude.
Also included throughout the play are several instances of "street
language" and "simulated sexual acts." 4 The play concludes with
5
Claude's death as a result of some unknown factor of the draft.
The plaintiff, attempting to obtain a suitable location in Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the presentation of "Hair", made several
requests of the defendants, members of the Municipal Auditorium
Board, for the lease of the Tivoli Theater. On each of three occasions
the request was denied.6 Following the last denial, the plaintiff filed
this action on November 1, 1971,7 seeking to obtain a declaratory judg1 Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632-33 (1943).
2 Southeastern Promotions, Inc. v. Conrad, 341 F. Supp. 465, 468 (E.D. Tenn. 1972).
3
4
5
score,

Id. at 473.
Id. at 473-74.
Id. at 473 (In addition to the plot, "Hair" has become well known for its musical
which includes several nationally known numbers.).
6 Id. at 468-69. The Directors, as members of the Board, were charged with the
management and operations of both the municipally owned Memorial Auditorium and
the leased Tivoli Theater.
7 This is not the first time that the producers and promoters of "Hair" have run into
difficulties presenting their production. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of West Palm
Beach, 457 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1972) (refusal to rent municipal auditorium violated plaintiff's first amendment rights); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Mobile, 457 F.2d
340 (5th Cir. 1972) (granting injunction requiring auditorium board to allow performance);
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Oklahoma City, Civil No. 72-105 (W.D. Okla., Mar. 27,
1972) (operators of civic center had proprietary power to prevent performance); Southeast-
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ment regarding its right to lease the theater for the presentation of
"Hair"." The plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction was
denied. Subsequently an amended complaint was filed, seeking a mandatory injunction to compel the defendants to lease the Memorial
Auditorium for the production. 9
The defendants, in reply, filed a motion seeking dismissal of the
plaintiff's complaint.' 0 In order to expedite matters, action on the
motion was reserved and the defendants were ordered to file an answer.
In their answer, the defendants contended that the theatrical produc12
tion "Hair" was a violation of municipal ordinances" and state laws
prohibiting nudity and obscenity in public places.' 8
ern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Birmingham, Civil No. 71-1158 (N.D. Ala., Dec. 20, 1971)
(refusal to rent auditorium constitutes denial of plaintiff's first and fourteenth amendment
rights); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd, v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ga. 1971)
(refusal to rent auditorium constitutes denial of plaintiff's first and fourteenth amendment
rights); Southwest Productions, Inc. v. Freeman, Civil No. LR-71-C-37 (E.D. Ark., Aug. 13,
1971) (granting injunction requiring auditorium to allow performance on grounds that
plaintiff's first amendment rights were violated); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of
Charlotte, 333 F. Supp. 345 (W.D.N.C. 1971) (defendants did not have discretionary power
to prevent showing); P.B.I.C., Inc. v. Byrne, 313 F. Supp. 757 (D. Mass. 1970) (holding that
Massachusetts laws prohibiting lewd and lascivious conduct could not be applied to first
amendment activity in the form of live theatrical performances).
8 This request was made pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201
and 2202 (1970). The plaintiff averred as grounds for jurisdiction 38 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and
1343(3),(4) (1970).
9 341 F. Supp. at 469.
10 Id. at 468. The defendants, in their motion, alleged as grounds for dismissal:
(I) the plaintiff was without standing to maintain the lawsuit, (2) the defendants, acting in a proprietary rather than governmental capacity, cannot
be required to lease the theater facility under their management, (3) the theatrical
production sought to be presented by the plaintiff would violate both the
ordinances of the City of Chattanooga and the laws of the State of Tennessee
and would be in violation of paragraph (1) of the standard lease requiring
compliance with such laws ....
(4) the plaintiff, being a corporation and not a
natural person, would have no right to maintain this action, and (5) the complaint fails to allege a cause of action.
11 CHATTANOOGA, TENN. CODE § 6-4 (1968) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to hold, conduct or carry on, or to
cause or permit to be held, conducted or carried on any motion picture exhibition or entertainment of any sort which is offensive to decency, or which is of
an obscene, indecent or immoral nature, or so suggestive as to be offensive to the
moral sense, or which is calculated to incite crime or riot.
CHATANOOGA, TENN. CODE § 25-28 (1968) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the city to appear in a public place
in a state of nudity, . . . or to appear in public in an indecent or lewd dress,
or to do any lewd, obscene or indecent act in any public place.
12 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3003 (Supp. 1972) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be a misdemeanor for any person to knowingly sell, distribute, display,
exhibit, possess with the intent to sell, distribute, display or exhibit
obscene material.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1013 (Supp. 1971) provides in pertinent part:
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A trial was then held on all the issues; the issue of obscenity was
severed 4 and put before an advisory jury pursuant to Rule 39(c) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' The evidence presented to the
jury consisted of the full script and libretto with production notes and
stage instructions, a recording of the sound track of all the musical
numbers, and a souvenir program. In addition, seven persons who had
seen the production were called as witnesses. An eighth witness, who
had not seen the production but had read the script, gave his opinion
as a drama critic.' 6 The issue was then submitted to the advisory jury
with the instructions of the court on obscenity,1 7 and the following
verdict was returned:
(1) We, the jury, find the theatrical production "Hair" to be
obscene in accordance with the definition of obscene as it relates to
freedom of speech under the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
(2) We, the jury, find the theatrical production "Hair" to be
obscene in accordance with the definition of obscenity as it relates
to conduct.' 8
Because the plaintiff's requested date of showing was only four
days away, the court's opinion was written immediately upon conclusion of the trial. In the opinion the court first denied the defendant's
motion for dismissal, 19 and then, turning to the merits, dismissed the
plaintiff's suit, holding that:
It shall be unlawful:
(a) for any person knowingly to sell or loan for monetary consideration or
otherwise exhibit or make available to a minor:
(1) any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion picture film, or
similar visual representation or image of a person or portion of the human

body, which depicts nudity, sexual conduct, excess violence, or sado-masochistic
abuse, and which is harmful to minors; ...
(b) for any person knowingly to exhibit to a minor for a monetary consideration, or knowingly to sell to a minor an admission ticket or pass or otherwise to admit a minor to premises, whereon there is exhibited a motion picture,
show or other presentation which, in whole or in part, depicts nudity, sexual
conduct, excess violence, or sado-masochistic abuse, and which is harmful to
minors.
13 341 F. Supp. at 468.
14

Id.

15 FFD. R. Civ. P. 39(c) provides in pertinent part:

In all actions not triable of right by a jury the court upon motion or of its
own initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury or, . . .may order a trial
with a jury whose verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter
of right.
16 341 F. Supp. at 472.
17 See notes 59-63 infra and accompanying text for an analysis of the court's charge
as presented and its bearing on the outcome of the case.
18 341 F. Supp. at 472.
19 Id. at 469-71. The court appeared to strongly discard the contentions made in the
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[T]he theatrical production "Hair" contains conduct, apart from
speech or symbolic speech, which would render it in violation of
both the public nudity ordinances of the City of Chattanooga and
the obscenity ordinances and statutes of the City and of the State of
Tennessee.20
Freedom of speech, which is so vitally important to the issue in
Southeastern Promotions, Inc. v. Conrad, is protected from federal
infringement by the first amendment which provides in part, "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press .... -21 Subsequently, the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment was interpreted to protect this freedom from unwarranted
22
state infringement.
Obscenity, however, has long been assumed to be outside the
ambit of the first amendment protection accorded to speech. 23 The
acknowledgement of this exception has created for the courts the perplexing problem of developing a workable standard for determining
what is obscene. One source of difficulty arises because the alleged
obscene matter is almost always interwoven in a form of expression
defendants' motion. With regard to ground one (see note 9 supra, for the basis of the
motion), the court, citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), held that the plaintiff did
have a sufficient interest as promoter to have standing to maintain the suit. On the
second count, the court disposed of an issue which had been the turning point in other
cases of the same nature (see note 6, supra), deciding that the defendant board, although
acting in a proprietary manner, could not allow one group to use the auditorium for a
specific purpose while denying it to another for the same purpose. The third ground of
the motion raised issues of fact and law which could only be decided after a trial on the
merits. The fourth ground was denied by the court with the decision that corporations are
considered persons within the provisions of the constitutional guarantees of due process,
equal protection, and freedom of speech. The fifth and final ground was considered
without substance if, as alleged by the plaintiff, the defendants did deny them equal
protection of the laws and freedom of speech.
20 341 F. Supp. at 477.
21 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
22 E.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). But see Engdahl, Requiem for
Roth: Obscenity Doctrine is Changing, 68 MicH. L. Rav. 185, 201-09 (1969); Rogge, The
Obscenity Terms of the Court, 17 Viu.. L. REv. 393, 415-21 (1972), where both authors
present arguments that the fourteenth amendment may not be applicable to the first,
thereby refuting the theory of the "incorporation doctrine."
23 See, e.g., Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736-37 (1877) (dictum) (holding that the
federal government has the right of regulation of the mail). Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 485 (1957), was the first case to actually hold that it was an exception. But see
dissent of Justices Black and Douglas in Roth at 354 U.S. 476, 508-14; Meiklejohn, The
First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. Rav. 245. See generally Emerson, Toward
a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963).
Other areas of speech held not to fall under first amendment protection include libel,
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952); "fighting words," Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942); and sedition, Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359,
369 (1931).
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protected by the first amendment. A second difficulty was developing
a substantive definition of obscenity. This latter problem appeared to
be the concern of the earlier cases in the area.
For many years the leading case was Regina v. Hicklin,24 an
action brought by the British government to have a pamphlet declared
obscene.2 5 The pamphlet was entitled The Confessional Unmasked,
and was published by an anti-Catholic group to show "the depravity
of the Romish priesthood, the iniquity of the Confessional, and the
questions put to females in confession." 26 The court adopted a standard for obscenity whereby material was to be judged by the effect of
the offensive material upon "particularly susceptible persons."7 Although the objectionable parts of the pamphlet were contained solely
in the second half in the form of certain questions supposedly put to
women in the confessionals, 28 these isolated instances, when considered
in the light of the effect upon such susceptible persons, were sufficient
to render the whole pamphlet obscene. The court concluded that the
obscene matter was calculated to deprave and debauch the minds of
its readers, and should therefore be outlawed. 29 Because the court based
its decision on these isolated passages, later cases have interpreted
the Hicklin standard as one whereby material is to be judged by the
effect of isolated passages upon "particularly susceptible persons. ' 3
It was not until 1933 that American courts outwardly rejected
the Hicklin rule as being inadequate. The first major decision came
with the well-known Ulysses case, involving James Joyce's classic
work.31 The District Court for the Southern District of New York,
in holding that "Ulysses" was not obscene, decided that a book must
32
be judged as to its effect on a person with average sexual instincts.
The decision was affirmed by the second circuit which held, that in
determining whether a book is obscene, the test is "whether a publi24 L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868).
25 Id.

362.

26 Id.

at

27 Id.

at 371. The court stated:

[A]nd I think the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to
such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may
fall.
The court was referring to the minds of the young and those advanced in age.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 370.
30 E.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1957).
81 United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses", 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), afl'd,
72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
32 5 F. Supp. at 184-85.
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cation taken as a whole has a libidinous effect."' 8 Following these
decisions, however, it was to be almost another quarter of a century
before the Supreme Court ultimately decided the issue.
In the landmark case of Roth v. United States,3 4 the Hicklin
standard was rejected in toto as being an infringement of freedom
of speech.8 5 Roth, which involved a prosecution under a federal obscenity statute,8 6 was decided simultaneously with Alberts v. California,
7
which dealt with a conviction under a California obscenity statute.
The question raised by both appellants was whether the obscenity
statutes in question abused the freedoms of speech and press. 88 The
Court, in holding that obscenity is an exception to first amendment
protection,89 affirmed both convictions. 4° In arriving at this conclusion,
Roth adopted the following standard for obscenity:
[W]hether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
41
whole appeals to prurient interest.
The standard was expanded in two subsequent decisions. In
Manual Enterprises v. Day,42 the Court decided that in addition to
appealing to a prurient interest, the material must also be patently
offensive. 43 Further, in A Book Named John Cleland's "Memoirs of
33 72 F.2d at 707.
84 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
85 Id. at 489. The Court stated:

The Hicklin test, judging obscenity by the effect of isolated passages upon the
most susceptible persons, might well encompass material legitimately treating
with sex, and so it must be rejected as unconstitutionally restrictive of the
freedoms of speech and press.
36 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (Supp. III, 1955), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970).
37 Law of April 21, 1858, ch. 242, § 1, [1858] Cal. Laws 204 and the Law of April
16, 1859, ch. 271, § 1, [1859] Cal. Laws 297, as amended, Law of March 30, 1874, ch. 614,
§ 25, [1873-74] Cal. Laws 429 (repealed 1961).
38 354 U.S. at 479.
39 Id. at 485. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
40 Id. at 494. The opinion of the Court was far from unanimous. Chief Justice Warren concurred in a separate opinion, but felt that the decision should be limited to the
facts and statutes in question. The Chief Justice also gave a preview of the "pandering"
concept, which was later to be adopted in Ginzburg v. United States. Id. at 494-95. See note
47 infra. Justice Harlan concurred in Alberts and dissented in Roth on the ground that
obscenity control should be left to the states. 354 U.S. at 496-508. Justice Douglas dissented,
and Justice Black joined, on the ground that there is no basis for retaining obscenity as an
exception to first amendment protection. Id. at 508-14.
41 Id. at 489 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court was not the first to use this
standard. Several federal and state courts had already done so. See cases cited 354 U.S. at
489 n.26.
42 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
43 Id. at 482.
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a Women of Pleasure" v. Attorney General,44 . popularly known as the
"Fanny Hill" case, the Court made it clear that three elements must
coalesce before material may be judged obscene. It must be established
that:
(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals
to the prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive
because it affronts contemporary community standards relating
to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the
45
material is utterly without redeeming social value.
Thus, the important requirement that the material be utterly without
redeeming social value was added. 48 Although other decisions have
qualified the Roth standard, 47 it is still the accepted one today. 48
However, this standard is to be applied only when the form of
expression is within the ambit of the first amendment. 49 Prior to Roth
the Court had extended first amendment protection to forms of expression other than pure speech, including motion pictures5 ° and
44 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (hereinafter Memoirs).

45 Id. at 418.
46 However, the clarification in Memoirs may have been too little and too late. The
standard as set out in Roth had already become the source of much confusion. For
example, the Court never made it clear whether a contemporary standard was to be
local, state, or national. The federal courts, at least, seem to agree that it should be a
national standard, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 192-93 (1964) (reversing conviction
of theater manager for showing the film "The Lovers"), Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370
U.S. 478, 488 (1962) (reversing decision barring mailing of certain magazines because they
were found to be obscene). Contra, United States v. West Coast News Co., 30 F.R.D. 13,
19-20 (W.D. Mich. 1962) (advocating a state standard). But even Jacobellis, which is the
leading case, has caused confusion. The Courts opinion which advocated a national community standard was signed by only two Justices, Brennan and White, while Chief Justice
Warren and Justice Clark joined in a dissenting opinion advocating a local community
standard.
Furthermore, state decisions run the gamut from national to local standards. See
generally, Comment, The Geography of Obscenity's Contempory Community Standards,
8 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 81 (1971); Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 1158, 1182-86 (1966).
47 In Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), the Court decided that materials used as a subject of pandering could serve to deny the materials first amendment
protection. In Mishkin v. New York, 383 US. 502 (1966), the Court held that where
material is primarily designed to appeal to a clearly defined sexual group, rather than the
public at large, the prurient appeal requirement of the Roth test is satisfied if the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in sex
of the members of that group only. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), held that
mere private possession of obscene material in one's own home could not be a crime.
Stanley immediately raised the question of how one was to get the material home without
committing a crime.
48 See Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (1972).
49 See 354 U.S. at 484-85.
50 E.g., Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (reversing lower court decision
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symbolic speech. 51 But as of today, the Court, in a case by case approach,
has not yet completed the task of determining whether all forms of
expression are to be protected. There still has been no decision by the
Court as to whether live theatrical productions are considered a form
of speech and therefore are protected by the first amendment if not
obscene.62 The problem has been left to the lower federal and state
courts and several are in agreement that theatrical productions and live
performances are "speech" and are to be considered protectible. 5
The courts employ a two-step procedural method when they are
faced with the task of making an obscenity decision. 54 As was previously
mentioned, it must be determined whether the form of expression is
constitutionally protectible. Second, if it is protectible, then the Roth
standard must be applied to the material to determine whether or
not it is obscene. If the material does fall within the Roth definition
of obscenity, it can be legally suppressed.
Conrad begins by following these steps. It first recognized that
theatrical productions are a protected form of expressison, 55 and then
proceeds to step two by applying the Roth standard. 56 It is at this point,
however, that Conrad departs from the Roth guidelines. This departure
may be clearly illustrated by an examination of the court's charge to the
jury. 57 The court first instructed the jury as to the applicability of the
upholding revocation of a license to show film on ground that it was sacrilegious). See
generally Note, Motion Pictures and the First Amendment, 60 YALE L.J. 696 (1951).
51 E.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (enjoining enforcement of
regulation requiring public school children to salute the flag).
52 Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634, 638 (N.D. Ga.
1971).
5 Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Mobile, 457 F.2d 340-41 (5th Cir. 1972);
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634, 638 (N.D. Ga. 1971);
LaRue v. California, 326 F. Supp. 348, 353 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (live sexual conduct); P.B.I.C.,
Inc. v. Byrne, 313 F. Supp. 757, 761-62 (D. Mass. 1970); Barrows v. Municipal Ct., 1 Cal. 3d
821, 824, 464 P.2d 483, 485, 83 Cal. Rptr. 819, 821 (1970) (simulated oral copulation in play
"The Beard"); In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 567, 446 P.2d 535, 538, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655,
658 (1968) ("topless" dance); Dixon v. Municipal Ct., 267 Cal. App. 2d 789, 792, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 587, 589 (Ct. App. 1968) (simulated oral copulation in play "The Beard"); Hudson
v. United States, 234 A.2d 903, 905 n.4 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967) (burlesque); Adams Newark
Theatre Co. v. City of Newark, 22 N.J. 472, 475, 126 A.2d 340, 342 (1956) (burlesque), afl'd,
354 U.S. 931 (1957); Adams Theatre Co. v. Keenan, 12 N.J. 267, 270, 96 A.2d 519, 520 (1953)
(burlesque); People v. Berkowitz, 61 Misc. 2d 974, 981, 308 N.Y.S.2d 1, 9 (Crim. Ct. N.Y.
1970) (play "Che'). See Hoffman v. Carson, 250 So. 2d 891, 893-94 (Fla. 1971) ("go-go"
dancer); Newark v. Humphries, 94 N.J. Super. 384, 390, 288 A.2d 550, 554-55 (L. Div.
1967) (burlesque). Cf. Hodges v. Fitle, 332 F. Supp. 504, 509 (D. Neb. 1971) ("topless"
dancing).
54 See Justice Brennan's opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187-96.
55 341 F. Supp. at 478-79.
56 Id. at 474-75, 479-80.
57 The charge to the jury reads in pertinent part:
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Roth standard to theatrical productions as a protected form of expression. 58 However, the court then proceeded to dissect the play into
speech and non-speech components, instructing the jury that the
conduct that the court considered neither illustrative of speech nor
symbolic speech should be judged according to different standards. 59
The charge concluded by stating that conduct which is not speech may
be judged "in its component parts" rather than within the context
of the play as a whole. 60
This dissection of the play into speech and non-speech components, and the subsequent determination that the conduct is not
symbolic speech, 61 appears to be an attempt to create an exception to the
The freedom of speech provisions of the First Amendment refer to speech
and not to human conduct that is not expressive of speech; that is, conduct
apart from speech or conduct that is not so closely related to speech as to constitute symbolic speech as it is sometimes referred to. Since the freedom of speech
provision of the First Amendment accords no protection against the regulation of
human conduct by the government, whether federal, state or local, the freedom
of speech provision of the First Amendment accords no protection against the
regulation of obscene conduct by the various levels of government. Since the
obscenity statutes and the ordinances relied upon by the defendants in this case
apply to both obscene speech and to obscene conduct, then irrespective of how
you may decide the issue of obscenity as it relates to the theatrical production
"Hair" when considered as speech, and when considered as a whole, you should
turn your attention to the conduct of the performers in the theatrical production
"Hair" that is not speech or is not conduct that may be considered symbolic
speech or expressive of speech and determine whether that conduct is obscene as
I shall now define the word.
The definition of obscenity as it relates to conduct apart from speech is the
same as the definition of obscenity as it relates to speech with two exceptions.
The first exception is that since no First Amendment federal constitutional issue
is involved, obscene conduct may be judged in its component parts rather than
merely judging the whole conduct or merely judging the whole of the theatrical
production in making your judgment regarding obscenity on the basis of conduct
as a whole or of the material of the production as a whole; that is, conduct may
be adjudged obscene or non-obscene either as a whole or in any of its component
parts.
Id. at 480-81 (emphasis added).
58 Id. at 479-80.
59 Id. at 480-81. The court, by deciding that the objectionable conduct is neither
speech nor symbolic speech, expressed its view to the jury on an issue of fact. The
conduct referred to appeared to be the mixed nudity scene at the end of the first act
and the subsequent simulated sexual acts. Id. at 473-74. Judges in federal courts, unlike
those in many states, are allowed to express their opinions on certain issues, if they
clearly leave the ultimate decision, in this case the question of symbolic speech, to the
jury. E.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Consol. Bus Lines, Inc., 179 F.2d 768, 773 (4th Cir. 1950);
Meadows v. United States, 144 F.2d 751, 754 (4th Cir. 1944); see 88 C.J.S. Trial § 284(a)
(1955).
60 341 F. Supp. at 481.
61 Here the court is attempting to make decisions where no acceptable criteria have
been set forth. For a suggested standard see Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 COLUM. L. REv.
1091, 1109 (1968). See generally Shugrue, An Inquiry Into a Principle of Speech Plus, 3
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Roth-Memoirs standard. However, to meet this standard, the work must
be judged as a whole; it cannot be deemed to be utterly without redeeming social value unless it is examined in its entirety. 62 Furthermore, Roth declared the Hicklin standard unconstitutional for the
very reason that to judge material on the basis of isolated segments
might very well lead to the suppression of material that legitimately
deals with sex.63
Thus, the distinction made by Conrad appears to be a departure
from the usual obscenity analysis. No support for its position can be
derived from the Roth-Memoirs standard, nor does Conrad cite any
other support in the area of obscenity litigation. Conrad does recognize
and deal with the case of Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of

Atlanta,64 which is factually similar but arrives at an opposite result.
The Atlanta case also considered an attempt by the defendants to
dissect the play "Hair" into speech and non-speech components for
purposes of finding specific conduct within the play obscene. 65 In this
instance, the court, contrary to Conrad, completely rejected the defendant's contentions, holding:
The court cannot accept the proposition that stage productions may be dissected into "speech" and "nonspeech" components
as those terms have been used by the Supreme Court. The nonverbal
elements in a theatrical production are the very ones which distinguish this form of art from literature. . . . [A] musical play
must be 66deemed a unitary form of constitutionally protected expression.
Here, Atlanta used a somewhat different approach than the Roth
rule in determining that plays must be judged in their entirety.
Atlanta decided, apart from Roth, that a play should be judged as a
unitary form of expression for the reason that plays are a unique form
of expression, and that to review them in their component parts would
destroy that which makes them unique from other forms of art.
6T
Obviously, the court was aware that the Roth approach was analagous,
CREIGHTON L.

REV.

267 (1970); Comment, Flag Desecration Statutes in Light of United

States v. O'Brien and the First Amendment, 32 U. PIrr. L. REV. 513 (1971).

62 The court in Conrad even conceded that, in viewing the play as a whole, it
cannot be stated that it was utterly without redeeming social value. 341 F. Supp. at 475.
However, the court in its development of the obscenity standard never recognized the
Memoirs modification as a required element of the obscenity test.
63 354 U.S. at 489.
64 334 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
65 Id. at 638.
66 Id. at 639 (emphasis added).
67 Id. at 639 n.3.
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and this factor may have influenced the court's recognition of the play
as a unitary form.
The court in Atlanta recognized that the argument for dissection
could be made in any obscene movie case, yet the court stated that
no case has been cited, 68 nor has the Supreme Court ever suggested
that the portrayal of sexual conduct in motion pictures is a non-speech
activity. 69 There would seem to be no appreciable difference between
motion pictures and live plays and consequently they should be
afforded the same treatment.
Conrad attempts to refute the position taken in Atlanta by stating
that it is a "false and dangerous doctrine that the First Amendment
forbids all regulation of conduct so long as that conduct masquerades
under the guise of the theatrical." 70 The court suggested that if any
crime other than obscenity were committed on stage the court in
Atlanta would have had no difficulty in dissecting the play into speech
and non-speech components. 71 Although the Conrad hypothetical may
be valid when considering crimes malum in se, committed on stage,
cases dealing more properly with the issue of obscenity have not
dichotomized live performances. 72
In Dixon v. Municipal Court,73 dealing with the play "The
Beard" which included an act of simulated oral copulation, the court
stated that plays are a protected form of expression.74 It further stated
68 Id. However, in State ex rel. Keating v. "Vixen", 27 Ohio St. 2d 278, 272 N.E.2d
137 (1971), decided July 21, the Ohio Supreme Court deemed sexual activity portrayed
on the screen to be conduct not protected by the first amendment.
69 334 F. Supp. at 639 n.3.
70 341 F. Supp. at 476.
71 Id. A similar observation was made in Barrows v. Municipal Ct., 1 Cal. 3d 821, 464
P.2d 483, 83 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1970). However, there the court felt such acts as murder and
rape were independently prohibited by law, whereas objectionable conduct considered
obscene cannot be prohibited by state statute without first meeting the constitutional
test for obscenity as set forth in Roth-Memoirs. Id. at 830-31, 464 P.2d at 489, 83 Cal.
Rptr. at 825.
72 In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655; Dixon v. Municipal
Ct., 267 Cal. App. 2d 789, 73 Cal. Rptr. 587.
Even cases which do not deal directly with the issue but extend such protection to
live performances appear to conflict with the position in Conrad. See LaRue v. California,
326 F. Supp. 348, 353 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (live sexual conduct) rev'd on other grounds, U.S. - (1972); P.B.I.C., Inc. v. Byrne, 313 F. Supp. 757, 761-62 (D. Mass. 1970) ("Hair");
Barrows v. Municipal Ct., I Cal. 3d 821, 824, 464 P.2d 483, 485, 83 Cal. Rptr. 819, 821
(1970) (simulated oral copulation in play "The Beard"); Hudson v. United States, 234
A.2d 903, 905 n.4 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967) (burlesque); People v. Berkowitz, 61 Misc. 2d 974,
981, 308 N.Y.S.2d 1, 9 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. 1970) (play "Che").
73 267 Cal. App. 2d 789, 73 Cal. Rptr. 587 (Ct. App. 1968).
74 Id. at 792, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
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that an allegedly lewd act is not to be judged as an isolated episode,
75
but only within the context of the whole play.

In re Giannini" considered the prosecution of a nightclub
manager whose club featured a "topless dancer" performing an
allegedly obscene dance. The California Supreme Court rejected the
prosecution's argument that conduct which alone is unlawful does
not become legal "because it is engaged in during an activity which
would be afforded First and Fourteenth Amendment protections," and
held that acts which may be unlawful in a different context may come
within the protection of the first amendment if incorporated in a stage
7
or screen presentation.
Conrad itself cites no cases to support its speech-conduct di78
chotomy. However, there are several cases which appear supportive.
In a 1968 decision involving the obscenity of the movie "I Am CuriousYellow", 79 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
in holding that movies are a protected form of expression, declared
the movie at hand to be non-obscene.8 0 However, drawing an analogy
between conduct on the screen and public acts of lewdness, the court,
in dictum, felt that if a sudden, unrelated, isolated episode of sexual
intercourse or irrelevant nudity appeared on the screen it could be
halted under established standards just as could similar material if it
appeared in print.""
Expanding this theory, the dissenting opinion in P.B.I.C., Inc. v.
Byrne,8 2 the first "Hair" case, stated that unrelated acts in an otherwise
75 Id., 73 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
76 69 Cal. 2d 563, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1968).

Id. at 571, 446 P.2d at 541, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 661.
78 See United States v. A Motion Picture Entitled "I Am Curious-Yellow", 404 F.2d
196 (2d Cir. 1968); P.B.I.C., Inc. v. Byrne, 313 F. Supp. 757 (D. Mass. 1970); Raphael v.
Hogan, 305 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See also State ex rel. Keating v. "Vixen," 27
Ohio St. 2d 278, 272 N.E.2d 137 (1971); Hudson v. United States, 234 A.2d 903 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1967) (Hood, J., dissenting). In "Vixen" the Ohio Supreme Court decided that
the activity portrayed on the screen was not speech, but rather conduct which was not
protected by the first amendment and therefore not subject to the Roth standard. 27 Ohio
St. 2d at 278, 272 N.E.2d at 140. However, this contradicts the Supreme Court holding
that movies are a protected form of expression. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
In his dissent in Hudson, which involved a burlesque performance, Judge Hood doubted
whether the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech applied to a performance that
was essentially one of conduct. Although admitting that such a theatrical performance
may be an expression of ideas, he decided that if the production before the bar could
be called an expression of ideas, then the same could be said of any conduct, regardless
of its nature. 234 A.2d at 908-09.
79 404 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1968).
80 Id. at 199-200.
81 Id. at 199.
82 313 F. Supp. 757 (D. Mass. 1970).
77
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non-obscene play could be suppressed, 8 and set forth a standard for
accomplishing this dissection which Conrad appears to closely parallel.
The majority of the P.B.I.C. court, in enjoining the state of Massachusetts from prosecuting the performers of "Hair" under the commonlaw crime of indecent exposure, decided that enforcement would
permit greater state interference with the live theater than the first
84
amendment allows.
The dissent, however, contended that in light of the recent trend
towards nudity on the stage, there may be an occasion when a prosecution under such statutes would be allowed without conflicting with
first amendment rights.8 5 It then set forth the following standard for
treatment of the objectionable portions:
If an integral part of the whole, a violation could occur only if the
whole should be obscene under existing standards. If not an integral part, a violation would depend simply upon proof of the
essential elements of the offense. This determination of the relationship of the alleged violation to the whole production would
involve a test closely analagous to the first or "dominant" theme
part of the three-pronged test for obscenity under existing stan86
dards.
Once it was established under this test that the objectionable portions
were unrelated to the theme of the play, there would be no need to
consider such factors as " 'contemporary community standards' " and
"'redeeming social value.' ",8
Id. at 772 (Garrity, J., dissenting).
Id. at 767. Other cases previously mentioned which have also held that such
statutes when applied to live expression are overbroad include Barrows v. Municipal Ct.,
1 Cal. 3d 821, 464 P.2d 483, 83 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1970); In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 446
P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1969); Dixon v. Municipal Ct., 267 Cal. App. 2d 789, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 587 (Ct. App. 1968).
85 313 F. Supp. at 772. The dissent stated:
Is an isolated (i.e., "separable from and wholly unnecessary to the theme or
themes of the performance") lewd act in an otherwise non-obscene play necessarily protected expression under the First and Fourteenth Amendments? . . .
The majority answers the question affirmatively. I would not.... [T]he act would
not be "protected" because not an integral part of the production as a whole; nor
"expression" because not communicative.
86 Id. at 774. Courts have often considered the relevance of the objectionable parts
to the dominant theme of the material. If the objectionable parts are relevant to the
theme, courts usually have found the material to be non-obscene. If the parts are not
relevant to the theme and independently obscene, courts then have usually found the
materials as a whole obscene. Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5, 91 (1960).
87 313 F. Supp. at 774. The court in Conrad also believed that the conduct was
isolated from the whole. 341 F. Supp. at 474. Furthermore, it appears that Conrad used
a test for symbolic speech in lieu of the "relation to the whole test." 341 F. Supp. at 475.
83
84
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Hogan,88

In Raphael v.
an obscenity action attempting to prohibit
a theatrical performance which included acts of sodomy, a federal
district court held that not all conduct intermingled with speech is
entitled to greater constitutional protection than conduct standing
alone; nor would acts prohibited by state statute be protected if they
are part of an artistic whole.8 9 The case appeared to turn on the fact
that the plaintiffs were arrested for consensual sodomy and public
lewdness as well as obscenity. 0 The court, although conceding that a
partial abridgment of speech might result, rejected the argument that
the consensual sodomy statute was void for overbreadth because it
applied to performances in stage plays.91 The court concluded that
the state interest in prohibiting public acts of sodomy on stage war92
ranted the statute's incidental infringement of first amendment rights.
It must be noted that Raphael failed to recognize that theatrical plays
were constitutionally protected and therefore the court had no problem
in recognizing that the prohibition of the forbidden acts was the more
important consideration. Had the court recognized that plays are a
form of expression within the ambit of first amendment protection,
the Roth standard would have given the first amendment argument
added weight, and the balance may have favored the first amendment
rights. Conrad, however, did not offer the aforementioned cases as support, but turned to areas other than obscenity to justify its position
that not all conduct associated with speech must be allowed.
4
United States v. O'Brien,9 3 heavily relied upon by Conrad,9
in-

volved a draft card burning as a symbol of anti-war sentiment. 95 The
issue was whether a federal statute making the knowing destruction of a
draft card a crime was an unconstitutional infringement of the defendant's right to freedom of expression.9 6 The Supreme Court, in
upholding the statute stated:
We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety
of conduct can be labeled "speech" whenever the person engaging
in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea. However, even
on the assumption that the alleged communicative element in
88 305 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
89 Id. at 755.
90 Id. at 756.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
94 341 F. Supp. at 475-76.

95 391 U.S. at 367.
96 Id. at 370-72.
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O'Brien's conduct is sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment, it does not necessarily follow that the destruction of a registration certificate is constitutionally protected activity. This Court
has held that when "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. . . . [W]e
think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
97
that interest.
The Court has thus set forth guidelines to be applied when the form
of expression is one of pure conduct without verbal speech. The Court
recognized that even pure conduct may have some communicative
significance, and must have some first amendment protection.98
However, the application of O'Brien to the Conrad situation must
be seriously questioned. For O'Brien to be applicable, it must be
assumed that the form of expression may be split into speech and nonspeech components. Conrad determined that theatrical plays are just
such a form of expression,9 whereas in Atlanta, the court refused to
make such an assumption, concluding that O'Brien was not applicable. 100
Second, and more importantly, O'Brien was written to deal with
expression in the form of pure conduct which has some communicative
elements. The Court had recognized prior to O'Brien that expression
in the form of conduct alone was not entitled to receive the same
degree of protection as expression in the form of literal speech. 10 1
97 Id. at 376-77 (emphasis added). But cf. Schact v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970)
(holding that statute prohibiting wearing of military uniforms in plays that tend to
discredit armed forces is restrictive of free speech).
98 Although the Supreme Court developed guidelines to be applied once the conduct
is recognized as having a communicative element, it made no mention of how to determine the point at which such an element exists. The Court in O'Brien merely made the
assumption that the element existed. Comment, supra note 61, at 520. It has been
suggested, however, that in borderline cases the determination of whether conduct is to
be treated as expression or action rests upon "whether the harm is immediate, whether
it is irremediable, and whether regulation of the conduct is administratively consistent
with maintaining a system of freedom of expression." Emerson, supra note 23, at 917 n.47.
99 See notes 55-62 supra and accompanying text.
100 See notes 64-69 supra and accompanying text.
101 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965). The Court in Cox stated:
We emphatically reject the notion urged by appellant that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to those who would
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However, in the usual case, a play employs a blend of both forms
of expression and any treatment of pure conduct contained within
the framework of a play is an artificial and forced method of determining obscenity.
Conrad, in order to meet the standards set out in O'Brien, stated
that the governmental interest in prohibiting "Hair" was not related to
the supression of free speech, but rather to "the suppression of public
and undisciplined sexual conduct, and the protection of public morality
and welfare."' 0 2 In Conrad, undisciplined sex was described as destructive of many values and institutions, including the family, which is
regarded as the foundation of every human civilization. 10 3 However, to
accept this position is to accept the proposition that courts have the
right and power to legislate to protect currently accepted standards
of public morality. Previous decisions have held that the protection of
expression of unpopular ideas is exactly the reason for which the first
amendment was designed. Kingsley InternationalPictures Corporation
v. Regents of the University of New York 10 4 involved the denial of a
license to show the film "Lady Chatterly's Lover", which advocated the
idea that adultery under certain circumstances may be proper.10 The
state contended that its action in prohibiting the viewing of the film was
justified because the picture portrayed a relationship which was contrary to the moral, religious, and legal standards of the citizenry. 10 6
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that the guarantee
accorded by the first amendment
is not confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or
shared by a majority. It protects advocacy of the opinion that adultery may sometimes
be proper, no less than advocacy of socialism
l0 7
or the single tax.
The Court has thus made it clear that ideas, even though contrary
to socially accepted public morality, may not be suppressed.
Nor has sound proof ever been offered to show a direct correlation
between obscenity and anti-social conduct. 08 For this reason, authoricommunicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on
streets and highways, as these amendments afford to those who communicate
ideas by pure speech.
102 341 F. Supp. at 477. But see Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F.
Supp. 634, 639 n.4 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
103 341 F. Supp. at 477.
104 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
105 Id. at 688.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 689. Cf. Bd.of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
108 E.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969); Memoirs, 383 U.S. 413, 431;
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ties who argue for controls over pornography and obscenity are
limited. 10 9 There is even some authority which asserts that such material
may be a substitute rather than a stimulus for anti-social conduct. 110
For the most part, opinions which have argued for obscenity
controls have not made it clear why they take such a position, talking
loosely about corrupting the morals of the reader through the suggestion of impure thoughts, but not specifying whether "morals" refers
to the reader's behavior or to his thoughts and desires. 11' In spite of the
debate on this subject, what is frequently overlooked is that the currently accepted Roth standard makes no reference to the potential
effect of such material on either the thoughts or conduct of the reader
12

or observer."

Even if evidence could be offered to present a causal link between
obscenity and anti-social conduct, arguments could still be presented
against the establishment of a corresponding standard. A free society
must deal with illegal action directly and must not depend on restriction of expression as a means of control. 118 All forms of expression
have some effect in influencing related conduct; 114 certainly no one
would advocate that all substantive expression be regulated.
Conrad, then, in an attempt to prohibit specific conduct within a
play, has created an exception to the Roth standard. Even assuming
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 510 (Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting); United
States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 769, 812 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting); Borman & Rush,
Obscenity: A Matter of Individual Conscience, 47 J. UstB. L. 490, 506-11 (1969);' Lockhart
& McClure, Obscenity in the Courts, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 587, 593-96 (1955);
Rogge, The High Court of Obscenity (p t s. 1 & 2), 41 CoLo. L. REV. 1, 201, 224 (1968-69).
For a summary of the psychological studies made on this subject, see Cairns, Paul &
Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity Laws and the Empirical
Evidence, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1009 (1962).
109 See Hoover, Combating Merchants of Filth: The Role of the F.B.I., 25 U. Prrr.
L. REV. 469 (1964); Schmidt, A Justification of Statutes Barring Pornography from the
Mail, 26 FOalDHAM L. REV. 70 (1957); Memoirs, 383 U.S. 413, 441-55 (1966) (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
110 Memoirs, 383 U.S. 413, 431-32; Murphy, The Value of Pornography, 10 WAYNE
L. REV. 655, 661 (1964).
111 Lockhart & McClure, supra note 108, at 590. One reason suggested for this is
that obscenity laws are not based on a conviction that obscene materials inspire anti-social
conduct, but rather that they are based on traditional ideas, rooted in this country's
religious history, of governmental responsibility for individual morality. Henkin, Morals
and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391 (1963). Accord,
Murphy, supra note 110, at 680.
112 Finnis, "Reason and Passion": The Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and
Obscenity, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 222, 224 (1967). Roth did not discuss the issue of whether
obscenity leads to anti-social conduct. By first holding that obscenity was not protected
speech, it was unnecessary for the Court to consider the underlying issue. 354 U.S. at 486.
113 Emerson, supra note 23, at 938.
114 Id.
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there is legitimate cause to prevent this conduct, 15 the Conrad approach raises problems in application.
An adoption of the Conrad reasoning without first setting out
explicit standards for the decision of whether the objectionable portions
are related or non-related, would easily clear a path for a return to
control by local courts. As in Conrad, if no guidelines for such a decision exist, 116 the opportunity for finding the objectionable portions
unrelated is great, and the resulting infringement on first amendment
rights could be substantial.
Therefore, if the Supreme Court should follow Conrad and decide
that the prohibition of nudity on stage is necessary, with the resulting
exception to or abolition of the Roth test, the Court should then set
out clear, restrictive guidelines for the determining of the relation or
non-relation of the nudity to the play in its entirety. Then, and only
then, would such an approach be acceptable. No court should be free
to arbitrarily infringe on first amendment rights, which is a likely
result of upholding Conrad in its present stage.
Alternatively, should the Supreme Court decide to reject the
Conrad dissection approach, then it is imperative that the Court bring
theatrical plays into the ambit of the first amendment, while making
it clear that the applicable Roth requirement that the play must be
judged as a whole is not to be ignored. This firm direction would put
117
an end to immediate dispute.
It is therefore clear that either approach is in need of refinement
before it may become the accepted rule in the area of live expression.
Kenneth A. Scutari
115 The two major arguments against obscenity legislation, both of which have already
been mentioned, are (1) the first amendment is absolute and therefore there should be no
exceptions to its protection (see note 23 supra), and (2) there is no proof of a link between obscenity, pornography and anti-social conduct (see notes 108-114 supra and
accompanying text).
116 See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
117 This would also discredit the approach taken in Raphael v. Hogan, 305 F. Supp.
749 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See notes 88-92 supra and accompanying text.

